The newest category edition – Policy
South Sudan
A 21-year civil war concluded in 2005 with a peace agreement between the North and South of Sudan; the accord included a referendum on independence for the South, slated for 2011.
Why it will become a state: The vast majority of people in South Sudan almost certainly favor independence from Khartoum. According to Sudan scholar Alex de Waal, the people of the South are “waiting patiently” for 2011.
Why it won’t: Little has been done to prepare for a split. Contentious issues of border placement remain unsolved, and no census has been taken in the South for decades. If it doesn’t go their way, lawyers in Khartoum could cook up any number of reasons to invalidate the referendum. The biggest deal-killer, however, is Sudan’s oil, much of which is located in the South. Given that Khartoum depends on oil for 70 percent of its export revenues, it will be loath to part with so much as a drop of crude.
Odds: Not great. The referendum will probably happen; and it will probably come out in favor of independence; and Khartoum will almost certainly find a way around the results.
Somaliland
Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, this former British protectorate has stayed free of the violence and mayhem that has plagued the rest of the country over the past 16 years. Meanwhile, Somaliland has developed its own government, army, and currency; all it lacks is recognition from the rest of the world.
Why it will become a state: Somaliland’s de facto independence is hard to ignore. The territory has been a model of stability in a chaotic region for over a decade and a half, and most Somalilanders have left the possibility of unity behind them.
Why it won’t: Southern Somalis are still attached to the idea of a united Somali Republic, so the recognition of Somaliland by the international community would likely lead to greater instability in the South and possibly war. Hence, there isn’t much reason for third-party states to extend recognition.
Odds: Very good. But don’t count on it happening any time soon. The African Union and other international bodies plan to establish peace and stability in the South first and worry about the status of Somaliland later.
Iraqi Kurdistan
Spread out across four different countries, the Kurds have never had an independent country of their own. Yet as the rest of Iraq burns, they are closer than ever to statehood in their autonomous region of Kurdistan.
Why it will become a state: Iraqi Kurds overwhelmingly support independence, as they made clear in a mock referendum in 2005. And as the rest of Iraq continues to degrade, the chances rise that the Kurds will strike out on their own.
Why it won’t: In a word, Turkey. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan might rejuvenate Kurdish separatism in Turkey, home to 14 million Kurds. Turkey (along with Iran, which also has a healthy population of Kurds) doesn’t want to take that chance, and it might use force to forestall a change in the status quo. For now, it won’t have to, as the United States maintains pressure on Kurdistan to remain in Iraq.
Odds: Fair. While expanding its trade ties with the autonomous region, Turkey has softened on the idea of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. And if Iraq falls apart and the Kurds declare independence, Ankara may have no choice but to accept a new southern neighbor.
Palestine
With their territory currently in flux, it’s hard to know what to expect for Palestinians in the short term. One thing is certain: After decades of control by Israel, people in the West Bank and Gaza yearn to be in charge of their own destinies.
Why it will become a state: The majority of both Israelis and Palestinians are reconciled to a two-state compromise solution. There is plenty of disagreement over the details—border placement, right of return, Jerusalem—but ultimately, they are just that: details.
Why it won’t: Both the Israeli and Palestinian sides have extreme radical wings that will prevent any compromise from ever succeeding; get close, and debilitating violence is sure to erupt. What’s more, with the recent Hamas-Fatah split, it’s very unclear what the future holds for the relationship of the West Bank and Gaza.
Odds: Good. Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat came very close to an accord at Camp David in 2000, and it’s only a matter of time before the two sides will be at the negotiating table again. Given the weakness in both camps, it probably won’t happen soon, but we won’t be waiting forever, either.